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1. Introduction 
The government budget in Korea has been viewed as relatively sound compared with other 
OECD countries, based on positive government net wealth and consolidated budget surpluses 
in recent years. For Korea, however, both government net wealth and consolidated budget 
balance suffer from some conceptual problems. First, the consolidated budgets coverage is 
not wide enough to include all relevant fiscal policies, omitting local government and 
important government activities such as the Medical Insurance. Second, government budget 
balance and net wealth are the results of past and present government activities. Therefore, 
they cannot be used to evaluate the effects of future changes in the economic environment, 
future cash flows of the government budget, or future fiscal policies. For example, population 
aging will raise Medical Insurance benefits and the Medical Insurance budget deficit unless 
the Medical Insurance contribution rate is substantially raised. The budget balance of the 
National Pension system, currently in surplus, will turn into a rapidly increasing deficit in the 
near future. The increasing demand for social welfare programs will contribute to the 
increase in government expenditure in the future. 
Generational Accounting (GA) provides a useful tool for the investigation of the 
sustainability of fiscal policies in Korea. GA covers all relevant government fiscal policies. 
Moreover, its forward-looking properties allow us to explore how the sustainability of the 
public finances is affected by various future developments such as maturing of the National 
Pension, increase in social welfare expenditure and population aging.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess Koreas long-term fiscal position using Generational 
Accounting. In order to take into account the special features of Koreas fiscal situation, we 
extend the traditional GA calculation in two ways. First, we incorporate prospective changes 
in the age profiles and aggregate benefits and contributions of public pensions. Maturing of 
the National Pension, whose benefit amount is currently small, will increase benefit payments 
to older age groups in the future, which will substantially change the age profile of transfer 
payments. A second extension of the standard method is that we incorporate expected changes 
in social welfare expenditures in the future. Even though its aggregate amount was limited in 
the past, social welfare spending has been increasing rapidly and this increasing trend is 
expected to continue for the time being. 
Our findings suggest a much larger fiscal burden on future generations than on 2000 
newborns under current policy. For reasonable growth and interest rate assumptions, the 
difference between the two cohorts ranges from 60% to 120%. We also find that a substantial 
part of fiscal burden on the future generations is explained by the long-run budgetary 
imbalance of public pensions and Medical Insurance. The generational accounts of public 
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pensions and Medical Insurance explain about 34% and 12% respectively of the net payments 
(defined as the present value of tax payments minus transfer income from the government) for 
future generations. The magnitude of the adjustment of tax and social insurance contributions 
burden required to attain long-run government budget balance is substantial. A 56-59% 
increase in tax burden will be needed if the adjustment is just the tax side and applies only for 
the generations born after 2000. If the adjustment is made to all cohorts alive in 2004 and 
later, the required adjustment is a 19-20% increase in the tax burden. If we delay the tax 
adjustment until 2030, the required tax increase reaches 37-39%. All these findings suggest 
that unless policy toward existing generations in Korea is substantially altered, future 
generations will face very heavy fiscal burdens  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the fiscal situation 
in Korea. Section 3 explains GA calculation procedure. In this section we describe our 
extensions of the standard methodology of Generational Accounting, and data used to 
construct the accounts. Section 4 presents the accounts and discusses their implications. 
Section 5 summarizes findings and draws conclusions.   
2. The Fiscal Situation in Korea 
Table 1 shows some recent developments of the Korean fiscal situation. The first 
remarkable change is the rapid increase in government expenditure and debt, even though 
their level is not high compared with that of OECD countries. The expenditure of the 
consolidated budget (CB), whose coverage includes the central government (general account, 
special account, and public trust funds) and non-financial public enterprises, has increased 
from 19.0% of GDP in 1995 to 25.1% in 2001. Government debt has increased from 9.4% of 
GDP to 20.8% during the same period. Despite these recent changes, the government budget 
in Korea has been evaluated as relatively sound compared with other OECD countries. Except 
for the (IMF bailout) period 1997-1999, a period of financial crisis triggered by the shortage 
of foreign currencies in 1997, the consolidated budget was in surplus and government net 
wealth (gross wealth less debt) is still positive. 
However, the surplus of the CB and positive net wealth do not necessarily imply that 
current fiscal policies in Korea are sustainable. Excluding the National Pension (NPS) budget 
transforms the consolidated budget balance from surplus to deficit. Excluding the NPS fund 
(75.6 trillion won as of December 2001) eliminates government net wealth (75.2 trillion won 
as of December 2001). The NPS budget surplus will be maintained for the time being, 
because the number of current pension benefit recipients is limited; it will take a considerable 
time for the majority of current NPS participants to acquire entitlement to NPS benefits 
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because of its short history1. However, the budget will eventually turn to deficit, since 
promised pension benefits are too generous relative to contributions. According to the 
projection of the National Pension Corporation, the administrative organization of the NPS, 
the NPS budget will turn to deficit in 2034 and its fund will be exhausted in 2049.  
Another important trend in Korean budget structure is the rapid increase in social welfare 
expenditure. The rate of increase in social welfare expenditure for the period 1995-2001 
(25%) is much higher than that of total central government expenditure (12.4%). Until the 
mid-1990s, social welfare expenditure was limited, as the Korean government placed a higher 
priority on other sectors, including economic development and national defense. The 
government restricted Medical Insurance benefits and maintained fees for services at low 
levels. Eligibility for the benefits of the public aid programs to low income classes was very 
restrictive and benefit levels were quite low. Coverage of other social insurance programs was 
also limited. However, since the mid 1990s social welfare expenditure has been increasing 
rapidly. This reflects structural change in the social welfare policies. The coverage of social 
insurance programs such as the NPS, Medical Insurance, Employment Insurance2, and 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance3 has been expanded. Public aid programs are 
also experiencing a structural change. In 2000, the Livelihood Protection System, which 
restricted eligibility by age and working ability, was replaced by the Minimum Living 
Standards Security System, which guarantees a minimum living standard to everyone who 
passes an income-and-asset-based means test, regardless of ones working ability. Therefore, 
we expect a substantial increase in social welfare expenditure, one that will be accelerated by 
population aging. Our projection shows that aggregate public pension benefits will increase 
from 1.1% of GDP currently to 16% in 2080. Benefits of the Medical Insurance and public aid 
programs are projected to increase from 1.7% and 1.1% of GDP, respectively, to 5.1%, 2.1%4 
during the same period. 
                                                
1 The NPS, which covers the largest proportion of the Korean population, was introduced in 1988. The 
minimum requirement for entitlement to a full-old-age pension, which will eventually account for the largest 
share of NPS benefit expenditure, is 20-year participation, which implies that this benefit has not yet been paid. 
Therefore, the NPS benefit payment at present is limited. 
2 Employment Insurance activities include the provision of unemployment insurance, employment stability 
promotion, and vocational ability development activities. 
3 This program is the Korean version of workers compensation, i.e., it insures the risks of accidents in the 
workplace. 
4 This projection is based on a conservative assumption about the income elasticities of social welfare 
expenditure (1.2) and MI benefits (1.2). Considering reduction of work incentives caused by the MLSS and the 
increase in fees for services by the MI, the expenditure of social welfare programs could increase more rapidly 
than our projection. 
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Unfortunately, social insurance contributions are not projected to increase fast enough to 
match the increase in social welfare expenditure. With population aging further contributing 
to a decrease in tax bases, a substantial increase in rates of tax and social insurance 
contributions, to which there would likely be strong resistance, would be needed. Absent this, 
the Korean government will eventually face large fiscal deficits. For example, our projection 
shows that the deficit of the NPS and the Medical Insurance will amount to 12.6% and 3% of 
GDP in 2080, if the current levels of benefits and contribution rates are maintained.  
These prospective changes in government budget indicate that the current consolidated 
budget and government net wealth are poor indices of Koreas fiscal sustainability. A better 
assessment of Koreas fiscal position requires a method, such as Generational Accounting, 
that incorporates prospective changes in the economic environment, government budget 
flows, and fiscal policies. 
3. GA Calculation Procedures 
3.1. Basic Framework5 
Generational Accounting is based on the governments intertemporal budget constraint. 
This constraint, written as equation (1), requires that the future net tax payments of current 
and future generations be sufficient, in present value, to cover the present value of future 
government consumptions as well as service the governments initial net indebtedness.6 
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The first summation on the left-hand side of (1) adds together the generational accounts 
(the present value of the remaining lifetime net payments) of existing generations. The term 
Nt,t-s stands for the account of the generation born in year t-s. The index s in this summation 
runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life.7 The second summation on the left-
                                                
5 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994) and Kotlikoff (1992) for further discussion 
and development of the method of generational accounting. 
6 The constraint does not assume that government debt is ever fully paid off, merely that the debt grows less 
quickly than the rate of discount, i.e., that it does not explode. Thus, it is consistent with the long-run existence 
of government deficits, as long as deficits are smaller than the amount needed simply to service the level of 
outstanding debt. 
7 Hence, the first element of this summation is Nt,t, which is the present value of net payments of the generation 
born in year t, the last is Nt,t-D, the present value of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year 
t, namely those born in year t-D. 
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hand side of (1) adds together the present value of remaining net payments of future 
generations, with s representing the number of years after year t that the generation is born. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the present value of government consumption. 
In this summation the values of government consumption, Gs in year s, are discounted by the 
pre-tax real interest rate, r. The remaining term on the right-hand side, gtW , denotes the 
governments net wealth in year t − its assets minus its explicit debt. 
Equation (1) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy. Holding the 
present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction in the present value of net taxes 
extracted from current generations (a decline in the first summation on the left side of (1)) 
necessitates an increase in the present value of net tax payment of future generations. 
The term Nt,k is defined by: 
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In Expression (2), Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payments to the government 
made in year s by the generation born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the number of 
surviving members of the cohort in year s who were born in year k. For the generations who 
are born in year k, where k>t, the summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generations 
year of birth, the discounting is always back to year t.  
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for each existing and 
future generation, with the property that the combined present value adds up to the right-hand 
side of equation (1). Though we distinguish male and female cohorts in the results presented 
below, we suppress sex subscripts in (1) and (2) to ease notation. 
Note that generational accounts reflect only taxes and social insurance contributions (taxes 
henceforth) paid less transfers received. With the exception of government expenditure on 
education8, the accounts do not impute to particular generations the value of governments 
purchases of goods and services because it is difficult to attribute the benefits of such 
purchases9. Therefore, the accounts do not show the full net benefit or burden that any 
                                                
8 We compute the generational accounts under two alternative assumptions about government expenditures on 
education, treating them as (i) government consumption expenditures; and (ii) government transfers. 
9 Bovenberg and ter Rele (1999) tried to incorporate the incidence of government consumption into generational 
accounts, assuming that all current generations enjoy the same (per capita) benefits from both government 
consumption and the public capital stock. The latter benefits are set at the imputed rent on the public capital 
stock, computed as depreciation plus the product of the interest rate and the public capital stock. However, their 
approach does not adequately deal with the public nature of government public goods. 
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generation receives from government policy as whole, although they can show a generations 
net benefit or burden from a particular policy change that affects only taxes and transfers. 
Thus, generational accounting tells us which generations will pay for government spending, 
rather than telling us which generations will benefit from that spending. Another characteristic 
of generational accounting that should be understood at the outset is that, as its name 
suggests, it is an accounting exercise that, like deficit accounting, does not incorporate 
induced behavioral effects or macroeconomics responses of policy changes. As a corollary, it 
does not incorporate the deadweight loss of taxation in its measure of fiscal burden, again 
following the tradition of budget incidence analysis. 
3.2. Assessing the Fiscal Burden Facing Future Generations 
Generational Accounts are calculated in two steps. The first step involves calculation of the 
net tax payment of current generations (the first term on the left-hand-side of equation (1)). 
This is done on the basis of current fiscal rules without being constrained by the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the government. In the second step, given the right-hand-side of equation 
(1) and the first term on the left-hand-side of equation (1), we determine, as a residual, the 
value of the second term on the left-hand side of equation (1), which is the collective 
payment, measured as a time-t present value, required of future generations. Accordingly, 
whereas the fiscal burdens for current generations are based entirely on current fiscal rules, 
the government budget constraint fully determines the fiscal burdens for future generations. 
Future generations are thus assumed to absorb the entire adjustment that is required to make 
the claims of various generations consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint.  
Based on the collective amount required of future generations, we determine the average 
present value lifetime net tax payment for each member of each future generation under the 
assumption that the average lifetime tax payment of successive generations rises at the 
economys rate of productivity growth. Leaving out this growth adjustment, the lifetime net 
tax payments of future generations are directly comparable with those of current newborns, 
since the generational accounts of both newborns and future generations take into account net 
tax payments over these generations entire lifetimes. Measuring the generational imbalances 
as the difference between two lifetime tax burdens provides a measure for the sustainability of 
the public finances. If future generations bear a heavier tax burden than the newly born do, 
current fiscal rules will have to be adjusted in the future to meet the budget constraint. 
3.3. Extending the Standard Method 
The standard method used to project the average values of particular taxes and transfer 
payments by age and sex starts with government forecasts of the aggregate amounts of each 
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type of tax and transfer payment in future years. These aggregate amounts are then distributed 
by age and sex based on cross-sectional relative age-sex-tax and age-sex-transfer profiles 
derived from cross-sectional micro-data sets. For years beyond those for which government 
forecasts are available, age- and sex-specific average tax and transfer amounts are set equal to 
those for the latest year for which forecasts are available, with an adjustment for growth. 
This procedure is based on the assumption that the age-sex-profiles of transfer payments 
and tax burden do not change over time. The standard procedure also assumes that 
government purchases, transfer payments and tax revenues grow at the same rate as GDP, 
although in some cases they are broken down into age-specific components, with the 
assumption that each component remains constant per member of the relevant population, 
adjusted for the overall growth of GDP per capita.  
We extend this standard method in two ways. As the first extension, we incorporate the 
prospective changes in the age profiles and aggregate amounts of benefits and contributions of 
public pensions. At present, the average National Pension benefit per member of cohorts aged 
70 and older is low compared with that for the aged between 55 and 70, since the NPS does 
not cover a large proportion of the older age groups. In addition, the number of beneficiaries 
and the aggregate benefit amount are limited, since most of those covered by the NPS, in 
older age cohorts, have not acquired the entitlement to full benefits because of its short 
history. However, maturation of the system will increase the average amount of benefit 
payments to the old-age groups, which will flatten the age profile of benefits and increase the 
number of the pension recipients and aggregate pension benefit amount. The proportions of 
the participants of the Pension for Civil Servants and Pension for Private School Employees 
are expected to change, since population aging is likely to change the demand for government 
service and education. Therefore, the change in the age profiles of benefits and contribution 
will be inevitable.   
Another extension of the standard method is that we incorporate expected future changes in 
social welfare expenditures. Even though the aggregate amount of transfer payments by 
Medical Insurance and social welfare services and public assistance was limited in the past, its 
amount has been increasing rapidly for the past decade due to the recent structural changes in 
social welfare policies. However, the current level of social welfare expenditure in Korea 
remains much lower than OECD average level, despite its increase in recent years. Therefore, 
the social welfare expenditure is expected to increase more rapidly than other components of 
government expenditure for a considerable period. Based on this expectation, we assume that 
the per capita amount of social welfare expenditure will increase more rapidly than per capita 
GDP until they reach the OECD average10. 
                                                
10 For detailed information about the future path of social welfare expenditure, see section 3.4.3. 
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3.4. Calculation Procedure and Underlying Assumptions 
To produce generational accounts for Korea, we require projections of population, taxes, 
transfers, and government expenditures, initial government wealth, and a discount rate. We 
consider the impact of total, not national, government. The fiscal policies in Korea are 
classified into following groups: social welfare policies, tax system, seigniorage, and 
government consumption (see Table 3). The social welfare policies are composed of public 
pensions, Medical Insurance (MI), Employment Insurance (EI), Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance (IACI), and social welfare services and public assistance (Minimum 
Living Standards Security System (MLSS) and other social transfer programs (OSTP)). Taxes 
are classified as labor income tax, capital income tax, consumption tax, taxes on asset-
holdings, taxes on asset-transactions and other taxes. Government consumption is broken 
down into expenditure on education and other government consumption. 
We follow the standard procedure, mentioned in section 3.3, to produce the generational 
accounts for most of the components of fiscal policies, except for the cases of public pensions, 
the MI, the MLSS and the OSTP. To project contributions and benefits of public pensions, we 
construct projection models for each public pension scheme. The aggregate benefits of the 
MI, the MLSS and the OSTP are assumed to increase more rapidly than the GDP growth rate, 
until they reach the OECD average.  
3.4.1. Population Projection 
The projections used to compute generational accounts are based on the 2001 population 
projection model of National Statistics Office (NSO). The 2001 NSO population projection 
covers the period 2001-2050. We extend the population projection up to 2110 using fertility 
rates11, mortality rates12, and international mobility rates13. Baseline calculations are 
conducted under the assumption that the total fertility rate and age-sex mortality rates will 
remain constant at their 2050 levels until 2110.  
3.4.2. Projecting Contributions and Benefits of Public Pensions  
Public pensions in Korea consist of 2 different plans: National Pension (NPS); and 
Occupational Pensions. The Occupational Pensions has 3 different plans: Pension for Civil 
                                                
11 The fertility rates (per 1000 women) are projected to decrease from currently 1.47 to 1.40 in 2050. For the 
time path of fertilities and alternative assumptions about the fertilities, see Table 2. 
12 The average life expectancy is projected to rise from currently 76 years to 83 years in 2050. 
13 International movement of population is limited in Korea. For example, net immigration in 2000 was 11 
thousand (emigration 43 thousand, immigration 54 thousand). We assume that the international movement rates 
remain constant at their 2050 levels until 2110. 
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Servants (PCS); Pension for Private School Employees (PPS); and Pension for Military 
Personnel (PMP). The PMP is excluded in GA calculation, since the data necessary for 
calculation are not published. Instead, we treat the deficit of the PMP budget as government 
consumption14. 
The National Pension  
We project the contributions and benefit payments of the NPS by year-sex-age, using the 
long-term projections of the National Pension Corporation (NPC) and data published in 
National Pension Statistical Yearbook.  
The projections of the NPC consist of: (i) projection of macroeconomic variables; (ii) 
projection of the number of insurants and their average income by year, sex, and age; and (iii) 
projection of the number of new pension benefit recipients and their average pension benefits 
by year-sex-age. The National Pension Statistical Yearbook publishes the items (ii) and (iii) 
for existing pension participants and pension recipients. We adjust the projection of the NPC 
in two ways: we recalculate the distributions of the NPS insurants and pension benefit 
recipients based on the 2001 population projection, since the projection of the NPC is based 
on the 1996 population projection; we also recalculate the average income of the pension 
participants and the average level of benefit amount, since our assumptions about 
macroeconomic variables, such as growth and inflation rates, are different from projected 
values of the NPC. 
We assume that the current NPS policies including replacement ratio of benefits and 
contribution rates is maintained, in order to evaluate the sustainability of the current system.  
The Occupational Pensions 
We construct a projection model for benefits and contribution of the PCS and the PPS, 
since their administrative organizations do not provide long-term projections. The projection 
model consists of 3 parts: (i) projection of the number and the distribution of participants and 
retirees by year-sex-age-period of service15; (ii) projection of contributions by participants by 
year-sex-age-period of service; (iii) projection of the number of benefit recipients and 
average benefit payment by year-sex-age.  
Projection of the number and the distribution of participants and retirees begins with an 
imputation of their distribution in benchmark year 2000. Neither the Statistical Yearbook for 
                                                
14 The total expenditure of the PMP for recent years is about 20-30% of that of the PCS. Since the ratio of 
expenditure for the former to that for the latter is declining, ignoring the PMP will not produce highly biased 
results. 
15 The distribution of participants and retirees by period of service is needed, since participants income and the 
benefits of the retirees depend crucially on the period of service. 
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the PCS nor the Statistical Yearbook for the PPS reports the joint distribution of the 
participants and the retirees by age-period of service. Instead, they report the distributions by 
age and by period of service separately16. In order to estimate the joint distribution, we 
assume that the age and the period of service are positively correlated: i.e. the insurants with 
shorter period of service are more likely to be younger. Under this assumption, we allocate the 
insurants with shorter period of service to younger age groups. The distributions after the 
benchmark year are computed based on the retirement rates by sex-age-period of service and 
distribution of new entrants estimated with the data reported in the Statistical Yearbooks. The 
number of new entrants of the PCS (the PPS) is assumed to increase at the rate of population 
growth rate for all ages (for those aged 16-24)17.  
Projection of contributions requires the projection of average wage profile by sex-age-
period of service. We generally assume that wages of participants depend only on sex and 
period of service, although for PCS participants the wage is assumed not to depend on the sex, 
based on the facts that (1) a civil servants wage is determined by position and period of 
service and (2) there is little sex discrimination on wages among civil servants, compared with 
the private sector in Korea. The wage level of each group is imputed using the data reported 
in the Statistical Yearbook for the PCS, the Statistical Yearbook for the PPS, and the Statistical 
Yearbook of Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. Contribution rates for 
the occupational pensions are assumed to remain constant at the current rates. 
The distribution of new recipients of the pension benefits by year, sex, age, and period of 
service is projected using the retirement rates and the distribution of participants. The average 
amount of benefits of new recipients by year-sex-age-period of service is computed based on 
the pension benefit formula. The Statistical Yearbook for the PCS and the Statistical Yearbook 
for the PPS publish the distribution of the existing benefit recipients and average benefit level 
of each group in the benchmark year. Using these values and distributions for the existing and 
new pension recipients, we compute the distribution of pension recipients and average benefit 
amount by sex-age after the benchmark year. 
Projection of the path of contributions and benefits by sex and age requires an assumption 
about the rate of wage growth, since new pension recipients benefits increase at this rate and 
the benefits of existing pension recipients are wage-indexed. We assume the same path of 
wage growth as that in the case of the NPS.  
                                                
16 The Statistical Yearbook for the PCS does not report the sex-age distribution. We assume that the proportion 
of female government employees is 30% for all age groups, based on the fact that the proportion is about 30% 
in recent years.  
17 This assumption is based on the fact that the role of government employees is closely related with the welfare 
of the whole population while the distribution of the students attending private schools is concentrated on the 
group aged 16-24. 
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Income Tax on Pension Benefits 
Income tax is newly imposed on the pension benefits from 2002. Since data on taxation of 
pension income are not available, we project the tax burden on the pension benefits under the 
assumption that the average effective tax rates across income levels (adjusted for overall 
growth of GDP per capita) remain constant at current levels.  
The tax burdens by year, sex, and age so estimated are reflected in the accounts for public 
pensions reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6, instead of being added to the accounts for income tax 
burden, under the implicit assumption that the tax revenue from taxation on pension income is 
transferred to the public pension trust funds. 
3.4.3. Fiscal Projections of Other Components 
Determining Generational Profiles 
The profiles of taxes and transfers are estimated in two steps. The first step involves the 
calculation of the profiles of the components belonging to each program. In the second step, 
we compute the weighted average of profiles of components for each program, where the 
weight is the tax revenue (benefit amount) proportion of each tax (each benefit). In order to 
estimate tax and transfer profiles we use various micro-data sets and statistical yearbooks 
published by the government (see Table 3). The micro-data sets include Daewoo Panel18, 
Korea Labor Panel19, Family Income and Expenditure Survey20, and National Survey of 
Income and Expenditure21.  
The Daewoo Panel is used to estimate the profiles of most taxes and social insurance 
contributions and some components of social welfare programs such as the Minimum Living 
Standards Security System. The profiles for consumption taxes and seigniorage are estimated 
using the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, since more detailed information about 
consumption and cash-holdings is contained in that data set. The Korea Labor Panel Survey 
contains the information needed to estimate the age-sex-profiles of net wealth. We use this to 
estimate the profiles of taxes on asset holdings, and also some components of capital income 
                                                
18 This data set is a PSID-type micro-data set constructed by Daewoo Economic Research Institute, which is a 
private research institute. The data set covers the whole population and the period 1993-1998.  
19 This data set is a PSID-type micro-data set constructed by Korea Institute of Labor, a state-run research 
institute. This data set covers the whole population and the period since 1998. 
20 This data set is annually constructed by the National Statistics Office. Unlike the Daewoo Panel and the 
Korea Labor Panel, this data set is not panel data. The sample is renewed every five years. The Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey covers families in urban areas with two or more members. It contains detailed 
information about consumption expenditures. 
21 This data set is constructed by the National Statistics Office every five years. It covers the whole population 
and contains detailed information about income, consumption, asset holdings and asset transactions.  
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tax and labor income tax such as corporation tax and Inhabitant Tax, since the standard 
method attributes the corporation tax burden to asset holders and the Inhabitant Tax burden is 
dependent upon the corporation tax burden. The National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure is used to estimate the profiles of Taxes on Asset Transactions, since it surveys 
the transactions in financial assets and real estate. Tax bases of Education tax and Special Tax 
for Rural Development Tax consist of: (1) the tax amount of some components of labor 
income tax, capital income tax, consumption tax, and tax on asset holding and transactions; 
(2) receipts of banks and insurance companies; and (3) some tax expenditures. Therefore, we 
use various data sources, containing information about the tax burden, financial asset holdings 
and tax expenditures, for the estimation of the profiles of the tax burden.  
For the components that are not covered by the micro-data sets, we use statistical yearbooks 
published by the government. In the case of Medical Insurance and Expenditure on Education, 
the governments statistical yearbooks report their age-sex profiles of the benefits and 
contributions. For the case of other components such as Employment Insurance, Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurance, the social transfer programs other than the MLSS, we 
impute the profiles in two steps. In the first step, we decompose the benefits of each social 
welfare program into age-specific benefits and non-age-specific benefits. The age-specific 
benefits and the non-age-specific benefits are assumed to distribute equally to the relevant 
age-sex groups and to the whole population respectively. In the next step, we compute the 
weighted average of the benefits for each age-sex group, with the weight being the proportion 
of each benefits amount, and impute its relative age-sex profile, with the level for the 
representative male aged 40 being normalized to be 1. Figures 1-20 show the age-sex profiles 
of benefits and tax burdens.  
Projection of Aggregates 
In order to project the aggregates of government consumption, taxes and transfers, we need 
to define the scope of government. We follow the definition of the National Income and 
Product Account (NIPA) of Korea. The government defined by the NIPA covers the central 
government, local governments, public education institutions, some social insurance 
programs, and non-profit organizations financed by the government and providing services 
such as research on the economy, science and public administration. Social Insurance 
programs classified as government organizations include the National Pension (NPS), 
Medical Insurance (MI), Employment Insurance (EI), Industrial Accident Compensation 
Insurance (IACI) and other programs into which to participation is mandatory. The 
Occupational Pensions that consist of the Pension for Civil Servants (PCS), the Pension for 
Private School Employees (PPS) and the Pension for Military Personnel (PMP) are not 
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defined as government organizations but as financial corporations in Korean NIPA, since they 
do not cover the whole population. We include the Occupational Pensions in the scope of the 
government program since the government controls them though various fiscal policies and 
guarantees their benefit payments 
The total expenditure of the government defined in Korean NIPA as of 2000 amounts to 
119 trillion won (23% of GDP). This amount includes government final consumption 
expenditure, subsidies, social security benefits and assistance grants, current transfers, gross 
fixed capital formation and capital transfers. We define government consumption expenditure 
as total expenditure on these items22 less social insurance benefits and benefits of social 
welfare services and public assistance. In order to prevent double counting of social insurance 
benefits, we subtract the benefits of social welfare programs such as the NPS (1.61 trillion 
won), the MI (8.79 trillion won), the EI (2.06 trillion won), IACI (1.68 trillion won), the 
MLSS (2.40 trillion won) and OSTP (3.20 trillion won), since these benefits are included in 
the NIPA measure of government expenditure. 
Our procedure for projecting the future path of total government consumption begins with 
decomposing 2000 government consumption expenditure into (1) age-specific expenditures 
and (2) non-age-specific expenditures. The NIPA in Korea classifies government expenditure 
into 13 groups: general public service (10.7% of government consumption as of 2000), 
defense (12.4%), public order and safety (6.2%), education (17.5%), health (1.3%), social 
security and welfare services (18.2%)23, housing and community amenities (6.6%), 
recreation-culture-religion (2.7%), fuel and energy (1.3%), agriculture-forestry-fishing 
(7.2%), mining-manufacture-construction (2.3%), transportation and communication (11.7%) 
and others (2.2%). The government consumption on education, health, and social security and 
welfare services are defined as age-specific expenditures, and other groups are defined as 
non-age-specific. The per capita level of non-age-specific government consumption is 
assumed to increase at the rate of productivity growth, whose real value is assumed to be 
1.5% per annum in the base case. All government transfer programs including social 
insurance and social welfare programs such as the MLSS and OSTP are age-specific, since 
the distribution of participants and benefit recipients depends on the demographic structure.  
                                                
22 As pointed out by Auerbach et al. (1991), an important issue that arises in considering government as well as 
private consumption is the treatment of durables. The proper economic treatment involves imputing rent on 
private and government durables and including this rent (and excluding expenditures on durables) in private and 
government consumption, respectively. However, the Korean NIPA does not compute and report the imputed 
rent. The government capital income reported in NIPA is mainly composed of interest income from financial 
assets. Therefore, we include capital expenditures such as gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers in 
government consumption expenditure. This simplification affects the annual estimates of government 
consumption expenditures, but not their present value and hence our estimates of generational imbalance. 
23 This proportion includes the amount subtracted for prevention of double counting. When computing the GA, 
we subtract the amount from this item.   
 14
Government consumption on education is assumed proportional to the population aged 0-
24, and the per capita level of expenditure for the relevant group is assumed to increase at the 
rate of productivity growth. Government consumption on health care, social security and 
welfare services are assumed as dependent upon the sex-age distribution of the MI benefits 
and government social transfers (the MLSS and the OSTP) respectively. We assume that 
government consumption on health, social security and welfare services, and the benefits of 
MI, the MLSS and the OSTP will increase more rapidly than per capita GDP until they reach 
the OECD average, since current levels of these expenditures are much lower than those of 
other OECD countries. Per capita levels of health and MI benefits (government consumption 
on social security and welfare services and the MLSS and OSTP benefits) of relevant age-sex 
groups are assumed to increase at the rate of per capita GDP growth multiplied by the income 
elasticity (1.2)24, until the total amount of government consumption on the health care and MI 
benefits (or on government consumption on social welfare and the MLSS and the OSTP 
benefits) reaches the OECD average as of 1995, 5.94% (or 4.12%) of GDP. The per capita 
benefits of relevant age groups for other social insurance programs, such as the EI and the 
IACI, are assumed to increase at the rate of productivity growth.  
Social insurance contributions are age-specific, since the bases for the contributions are 
labor income and business income that are associated with the economically active 
population. We assume that per capita contributions of relevant age groups will increase at the 
productivity growth rate except for the case of the MI. The MI contributions are treated 
separately in order to take into account the tendency of per capita MI benefits to increase 
more rapidly than productivity growth, and the structural problem of the MI budget in Korea. 
In recent years, MI contribution revenues have fallen far short of MI benefits. As of 2000, 
revenues were 80% of benefits; the difference between them is financed by government 
subsidy. We assume that the difference between the contribution revenue and the benefit 
expenditure per participant remain constant at the level of 200025, since there is strong 
resistance to increases in the MI contribution rate.  
Aggregate labor income tax and capital income tax revenues are projected under the 
assumption that per capita values depend on productivity growth and the size of the 
                                                
24 The income elasticity of the government expenditure on health care is based on the estimates by Newhouse 
(1997), Leu (1983, 1986), Gertham et al. (1998, 1992) and the OECD (1993), whose values range between 1.2 
and 1.4. Exceptionally low or high estimates are produced by Gerdtham (1991, 1992) (0.74), Moon (2000) 
(1.75) and the OECD (1993) (1.6). In the case of the government expenditure on social security and welfare 
services, Moon (2000) produced a high estimate of income elasticity (1.54). We make a very conservative 
assumption about the income elasticity (1.2) in order to avoid the over-projection of the government 
expenditure on these sectors. We also try sensitivity analyses assuming the estimates of Moon (2000) and lower 
values for the elasticities (see section 4.4).  
25 The population aging will widen the gap between the total MI contribution revenue and benefits expenditure.  
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economically active population, i.e., labor income tax and capital income tax revenues are 
assumed to be proportional to the product of the economically active population (aged 18-65) 
and average productivity of those belonging to these age groups, and average productivity is 
assumed to increase at the rate of productivity growth. Other taxes are treated as non-age-
specific, i.e. the total tax revenue increases at the rate of GDP growth. 
3.5. Treatment of Corporation Tax 
The corporation tax burden is assumed proportional to the wealth. The distribution of net 
wealth is estimated using the Korea Labor Panel. The corporation tax requires special 
treatment, because of two related problems with using measured corporation tax revenue to 
determine the burden of corporate income taxation. First, existing assets may have excess 
future taxes capitalized into their values; such taxes should not be assigned to new investors 
even if they occur in the future. On the other hand, the timing of payments of taxes from new 
investment may have a different pattern than would an income tax, meaning that the ratio of 
current annual tax payments may not provide an accurate measure of the effective marginal 
tax rate facing new investment. To correct these biases, we use the following methodology. 
Our calculation is based on the user cost of capital approach, which assumes that the marginal 
product of capital equals the user cost of capital, C, where 
 
(3)  
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where r is the investors required after-tax return, δ is the investments economic rate of 
depreciation, τ is the investors marginal tax rate, and z is the present value of depreciation 
allowances.  
Two measures are necessary for the allocation of capital income taxes: the tax-based 
discount on old capital (Q) and difference between the marginal effective tax rate on new 
capital and average capital income tax rate (∆). 
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where 0z  is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of old capital. 
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is the average capital income tax rate. 
In order to calculate z0, we need to consider past patterns of investment. We assume that 
investment grows at a constant rate n. Then at date 0 (the present) the nominal amount of 
capital purchased at date s was I0e-(n+π)s, where π is the inflation rate. If this investment has 
been written off at the constant geometric rate ϕ, the asset at date 0 has a basis of I0e-(n+π)se-φs 
and receives depreciation allowances of ϕ times this basis. Thus total allowances on the 
existing capital stock K are 
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The present value of all depreciation allowances on old capital equals the basis of each 
vintage multiplied by the present value of remaining depreciation deductions on that vintage:  
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 where z  is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of depreciated basis. 
Substituting (6), (7), and (10) into (5) yields 
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We select values of the parameters used for the calculation of ∆ and Q based on the 
realized values of variables related to corporation management and tax law for the period 
1991-2001. The economic depreciation rate δ is calculated using the analysis of Kwack 
(1985) and the estimated asset proportion reported in Pyo (2002). The resulting value of 
economic depreciation is 8%. The inflation rate and real growth rate of investment are 
assumed to be 5% and 4% respectively. The geometric rate of the depreciation allowance ϕ is 
assumed to be 15% based on the estimate of Chun (2003). The investors required after-tax 
rate of return is calculated using the formula for cost of capital for each type of marginal fund 
source and the estimated proportion of investment by source of fund reported in the Analysis 
of Private Enterprise Management; the resulting value is 8.5%. The present value of 
depreciation allowances (z) is 0.528, based on the calculation using equation (16). The 
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corporation tax rate is assumed 0.32. The resulting values for Q and ∆ are 0.0844 and 
0.003826. These fractions are multiplied by the 404 trillion won, the value of depreciable 
assets held by the corporation in 2000 to arrive at a 34.1 trillion won capitalized burden on 
old capital and 1.53 trillion won subtraction from current total corporation income taxes. 
With these values, we correct for the capitalization of corporation tax in old capital values 
and the timing of taxes on new capital.  
3.6. Determining Government Net Wealth and Discount Rates 
We take net capital income (6.3 trillion won as of 2000), including net interest income and 
rents, divided by the sum of our assumed real interest rate (3.5%) and an assumed inflation 
rate (3%)27 as our measure of 2000 government net wealth, as in Auerbach et al. (1991). The 
resulting value of government net wealth as of 2000 is 97.1 trillion won. We assume that the 
value is 100 trillion won at the end of 2000. 
The discount rate for the evaluation of GA is assumed 6.5%, based on the values of the 
assumed real interest rate and the assumed inflation rate. We also try sensitivity analysis using 
higher discount rate (7.5%), since in the presence of uncertainty the discount rate should 
probably be higher than the governments borrowing rate28.  
4. Findings 
The benchmark year in the GA calculation is 2000. We regard the generations alive in the 
benchmark year as current generations and classify cohorts by the age. We treat cohorts born 
in 2001 and after as future generations. We compute net payments (or net taxes) across 
generations under the alternative assumptions of treatment of corporation tax and educational 
expenditure. Net Payment (I) is the generational account taking account of the infra-marginal 
corporation tax adjustment, explained in section 3.5. Net Payment (II) is the account without 
consideration of the tax adjustment. Net Payment (III) is the net payment, treating educational 
expenditure as a transfer. We also compute the composition of generational accounts for fiscal 
policies including social insurance programs, social transfer programs and taxation of various 
tax bases separately.  
                                                
26 The values of Q and ∆ differ noticeably from those in Auerbach et al. (1991). The difference for the values is 
due mainly to the difference in the required after-tax rate for investors. The value adopted in this study is 8.5% 
while that used in Auerbach et al. (1991) is 4%. The other parameter values related to Q and ∆ adopted in the 
two studies are quite similar. 
27 The assumed real interest rate and inflation rate are based on the values of interest rates for government bonds 
and inflation rates realized in recent years. 
28 In the presence of uncertainty, we need to adjust the risk of uncertain government spending and taxes in the 
future. If the risk aversion on the uncertain taxes is larger than that of uncertain spending, a higher discount rate 
than the risk-free governments borrowing rate should be adopted. 
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4.1. The Burden on Future Generations 
Tables 4-6 report the generational accounts for male, female and sex-combined cohorts, 
under the base case assumptions for the productivity growth rate (1.5%), the discount rate 
(6.5%) and fertility rate (medium fertility). All of these tables show positive values of the net 
payments for most cohorts alive in 2000 except for cohorts aged 90 or older, indicating that 
most generations will, on balance, pay more in present value than receive. This result is robust 
under the alternative assumptions regarding the treatment of intra-marginal capital income 
taxes and educational expenditure. One reason for positive burdens even among the elderly is 
the high taxes on consumption, capital income and assets, relative to taxes on labor income29. 
The age profile of the average tax burden on capital is shown more skewed to older age 
groups than that of labor income tax and the average level of consumption tax burden for 
older age groups is quite high (see Figures 13-16).  
The more important reason for the result is that the aggregate amounts of social welfare 
benefits such as public pensions benefits, Medical Insurance (MI) benefits, Minimum Living 
Standards Security (MLSS) Benefits and other social welfare services (OSTP) are quite small 
as of 2000 (see Figures 25-27). Aggregate public pension and MI benefits are 1.1% and 1.7% 
of GDP respectively as of 2000 and those for the MLSS and the OSTP are 0.5% and 0.6% of 
GDP respectively. As a result, the net taxes as of 2000 are positive for most cohorts except for 
the groups aged 90 or more (see Figures 21-23). However, maturation of the public pension 
system30 and the projected increase in social welfare expenditures will increase transfer 
payments to old-age groups.  As a result, the accounts for a wider range of old-age groups will 
turn to negative. For example, net taxes for groups aged 65 or more as of 2050 are negative 
(see Figure 24).  
There are some differences among the three measures of net payment. Net Payment (I) is 
larger than Net Payment (II) for older generations31. This is mainly due to the fact that older 
cohorts hold much larger proportion of net wealth, whose prices are reduced because of 
capitalization of capital income taxation. Treating all capital income taxes as marginal taxes 
on new capital income lowers the fiscal burden on older living generations, since these groups 
are no longer being assigned the reduction in capital values associated with the infra-marginal 
taxation on old capital. The difference between the two measures is larger for males, since the 
proportion of net wealth owned by males is larger than that owned by females. The 
                                                
29 Revenues from consumption tax, capital income tax, taxes on asset holding, and labor income tax as of 2000 
were 9.1%, 5.1%, 1.3%, and 2.2% of GDP respectively.  
30 Figure 4 shows that the maturing of the public pension will increase the benefit levels of the aged groups and 
flatten the age profile of public pension benefits. 
31 For example Net Payment (II) of the age-85 cohort is lower than Net Payment (I) by 46%. 
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importance of the special treatment of capital income taxes is also demonstrated in the 
changes of net payments for younger living cohorts. Net payment (II) for younger generations 
is larger than net payment (I)32, since these groups hold little capital and will face many years 
of somewhat higher marginal tax rates. Treating expenditure on education as a transfer to the 
relevant age groups decreases net payments, especially for younger age groups33. 
A common feature of the three measures of the net payment is that the net payments for 
younger cohorts are much larger than those for older generations. This primarily reflects the 
fact that older generations, whose members typically expect a shorter period until retirement 
than younger generations, can expect to pay relatively small amounts of taxes and social 
insurance contributions over the rest of their lives, while receiving MI benefits, public 
pensions benefits and other social welfare benefits, even though their amount is not very large 
as of 2000. In addition, the net payments for males are larger than for females for most 
cohorts, because of lower female economic participation rates, and the fact that many women 
receives social insurance survivors benefits as dependents of the deceased and tend to receive 
larger amount of the MI benefits and social transfer payments than men.  
Net payments are largest around age 20, because around this age people tend to join the 
labor market and start to work. Therefore, they expect the longest economic participation 
periods from this age. For example, the age-20 account (Net Payment (I) and Net Payment 
(II)) is at least 25% higher than the age-0 account, for both males and females. In the case of 
Net Payment (III), the difference is larger. The age-20 account is at least 100% higher than the 
age-0 account. Net payments decline from age 20 onward. In particular, there is a sharp 
decrease in net payments between age 50 and age 60, since around age 55 many workers tend 
to retire and acquire eligibility for social welfare benefits, including public pension benefits. 
However, the net payments of many older age groups are still positive because they pay 
substantial amounts of consumption tax and tax on capital and the amount of social welfare 
benefits is limited as of 2000.  
The bottom row of each table, labeled Future Generations, indicates the present value of 
amounts that those born in 2001 will, on average, pay, assuming that subsequent generations 
pay this same amount except for an adjustment for growth. The accounts (Net Payment (I) 
and Net Payment (II)) for future generations for males, females, and combined cohorts are 
about 115% larger than those for the aged 0. In the case of the Net Payment (III), the accounts 
for the future generations are about 195% higher than those for the aged 034.  
                                                
32 For groups aged less than 20, Net Payment (II) is higher than Net Payment (I) by about 18%. 
33 For groups aged less than 20, Net Payment (III) is 59-84% of Net Payment (I).  
34 The difference in accounts between age-0 and future generations is much larger in the case of Net Payment 
(III) since education services are concentrated among age groups below 20 (see Figure 20). 
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This finding implies that the current fiscal policies are not sustainable and the substantial 
amount of fiscal burden is shifted to the future generations. This finding can be contrasted 
with the fact that for the last few years, we have observed the surplus of the consolidated 
budget balance and positive government net wealth. Considering the conceptual problems of 
the consolidated budget balance and government net wealth as indices for the fiscal 
sustainability, the generational accounts will contribute to correct the fiscal illusions caused 
by the consolidated budget.  
4.2. Composition of Generational Accounts 
In Tables 4-6, the generational accounts are broken down into tax and transfer components. 
For social insurance programs, the figures reflect present values of net payments. The 
accounts for public pensions across age groups show irregular patterns, since public pensions 
consist of two different systems: National Pension (NPS) and Occupational Pensions.  
In the case of the National Pension, net payments are most negative for those aged 35 to 55. 
This means that these groups benefit the most from the NPS, and simply reflects the fact that 
age groups 35-55 are the main participants of the system at this early stage of its introduction. 
For older age groups, the net benefits are smaller, since the number of them covered by the 
system is limited and thus the average level of benefits is low. Net benefits are smaller for 
younger age groups, since they expect longer economic participation periods and have to pay 
larger amounts of contributions for the rest of their lives, while benefits are more heavily 
discounted than for older age groups. The lower values of net benefits also reflect the fact that 
the replacement ratio has been lowered35 since the introduction of the system in order to 
decrease the implicit debt of the system. The male generational accounts for the NPS are more 
negative than the female accounts, since the NPS mainly covers income-earners and economic 
participation rates for males are higher than for females. Because of generous benefits 
compared with contributions, the budgetary burden will be shifted to the future generations. 
For the future generations, the generational account of the NPS represents about 25% of the 
Net Payment (I) or the Net Payment (II), and accounts for 31% of the Net Payment (III).  
The PCS turns out to be a much more generous pension scheme than the NPS. The 
combined account of the PCS for those aged 0 is about 15.3% of the NPS for the same age 
group while the number covered is only about 5.6% of the latter36. This means that the 
                                                
35 The 1998 revision of the NPS Act lowered the replacement ratio from 70% to 60% for the benefit recipients 
with 40-year participation period. In the process of the NPS revisions, the government adopted a phase-out 
scheme that, for the period before the revision, the replacement ratio under the old system is applied, while for 
the period after the revision, the new pension benefit formula is employed for the calculation of benefits.  
36 The number of the participants in the NPS was 16.2 million as of December 2000, while that to the PCS was 
about 909 thousand. 
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average per capita lifetime net benefit of participants to the PCS is about 2.7 times as large as 
that of participants in the NPS.  
The difference in the magnitude of net benefits is primarily due to the difference in the 
replacement ratio, the base income for benefits and contributions, the benefit entitlement age, 
and the indexation method for benefits. The replacement ratio of the NPS for an average 
income earner with 20 years of contribution is 30%, while that of the PCS is about 50%. The 
base income for the NPS benefits is lifetime average income37 while the base income for the 
PCS (and other Occupational Pension schemes) is the average wage income for the last three 
years before the recipients retirement. The wage level around retirement is much higher than 
the lifetime average income, since the wage structure of the government employees specifies 
a higher level for one with a longer period of service. Furthermore, in the case of the NPS, an 
upper bound for the base income is specified, in order to prevent it from providing excessive 
benefits for high-income workers, while the PCS does not limit base income for high-income 
workers. Another difference is that the benefits of the PCS are totally income-related while 
the NPS benefit formula has a strong redistributive element. Finally, the differences in the 
benefit entitlement age38 and indexing method further widen the gap of benefits between the 
two pension plans. The entitlement age for the NPS is currently 60, while pension benefits of 
the Occupational Pension schemes are paid immediately after retirement. For government 
employees, private school employees and military personnel who joined the Occupational 
pensions after 1995, the pension benefit entitlement age is 60, but those who joined before 
1995 will receive pension benefits immediately after retirement. The method for maintaining 
the real value of benefits is based on inflation indexing for the NPS while the Occupational 
Pension schemes are indexed to wage growth. Thus, PCS benefits grow faster than prices, 
given normal productivity growth.  
Compared with the NPS, the per capita net benefits of the PCS for older age groups are 
larger. Unlike the NPS, which has limited coverage for those above age 60, the PCS covered 
most of the older age groups owing to its earlier introduction (in 1960). For future 
generations, the generational account of the PCS represents 31.6% of that of the NPS, which 
is equivalent to 7.9% of Net Payment (I) or Net Payment (II) (or 9.8% of the Net payment 
(III)). This means that the fiscal burden shifted to future generations per one participant of the 
PCS is about 5.6 times as large as the value for the NPS39. 
                                                
37 The base income for the NPS benefits is the average of income during the participation period of each 
participant. Henceforth, we denote this average income as lifetime average income. 
38 The difference in entitlement age further widens the gap of the benefit level between the two public pension 
schemes, since the participants in the PCS expect a longer benefit-receiving period. 
39 In addition to more generous benefits of the PCS and larger net benefit of older age groups, a smaller pension 
fund is another reason for the heavier fiscal burden of future generations caused by the PCS. The funds of the 
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Comparing the net benefits across sex groups, it is found that males benefit much more 
from the PCS than females, since the proportion of male government employees is much 
higher than female employees. The proportion of male government employees is about 70% 
as of 2000 and the proportion was much higher before 2000. It is also remarkable that for 
groups aged more than 70 the net benefits for females are much smaller than for males, and 
the age groups whose accounts are most negative are younger for females40. This reflects the 
facts that the PCS has not covered many females in the past and that female government 
employees tend to retire earlier than their males counterparts. 
The net benefit per participant of the Pension for Private School employees (PPS) is 
smaller than that of the PCS, even though these two pension plans share the same formula for 
contributions and benefits. The lifetime net benefit from the PPS under the current policy 
regime, which is represented by the accounts for age 0, is about 7.9% that of the PCS, while 
the number of participants of the former is 23.2% of the latter41. This is primarily due to the 
expected future decrease in the number of students due to population aging and the shorter 
duration of service of private school employees. In the financial projection models of the PCS 
and the PPS, the numbers of new entrants of the two plans are assumed proportional to the 
whole population and the population aged 0-24, respectively. The decrease in fertility rates 
and death rates will decrease the proportion of the younger age groups, and this will reduce 
the ratio of those covered by the PPS to those covered by the PCS. As of 2000, the average 
lengths of continuous service of government employees and private school employees are 
14.8 years and 11.3 years respectively. In particular, the average expected duration of service 
of female private school employees is only 8.0 years, while that of males is 13.2 years. The 
shorter expected period of participation for the PPS caused by the shorter expected duration of 
service will lower the level of benefits. The fiscal burden shifted to future generations by the 
PPS is much smaller than that of the PCS. The generational account of the PPS for the future 
generations is only 12.9% of that of PCS, as opposed to the ratio of the number of participants 
(23.2%). This implies that the fiscal burden per participant shifted to the future generations by 
the PPS is about 55.6% of the value for the PCS. This is primarily due to the shorter history42 
and larger magnitude of pension funds (4.0 trillion won as of 2000) as well as the shorter 
duration of service. Because of the shorter history of the PPS, its coverage of older age groups 
is narrower than that of the PCS and, as a result, the net benefits of older age groups from the 
                                                                                                                                                   
NPS and the PCS as of 2000 are 60.6 trillion won and 1.8 trillion won, respectively. 
40 The accounts are most negative between ages 45 and 70 for males, and between ages 30 and 65 for females.  
41 The number of the participants in the PPS was 211 thousand as of December 2000, while that in the PCS was 
about 909 thousand. 
42 The PPS was introduced in 1975.  
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PPS are relatively small. Even though the number of the new female entrants to the PPS is 
larger than that of new male entrants43, males benefit much more from the PPS than females, 
since the expected duration of service for males is much longer than that of females.  
The fiscal burden of the future generations caused by public pensions is substantial. For 
future generations, the account of the whole public pension system explains 34% of Net 
Payment (I) or Net Payment (I), and accounts for 42% of Net Payment (III).  
The accounts of Medical Insurance (MI) for all the sex-age cohorts alive in 2000 show 
negative values. This simply reflects the fact that Medical Insurance contributions fall short of 
the benefit expenditure. As of 2000, MI contribution revenue is about 80% of MI benefits. 
The current gap is explained primarily by the fact that government provides subsidies to the 
self-employed in the form of contribution discounts44. The magnitude of the gap will not be 
easily reduced. There are increasing pressures on MI expenditure because of the current low 
level45: a pressure to widen the scope of medical treatments covered by MI to more expensive 
medical cases46, a pressure to increase fees for medical services47, and population aging. 
Experience over the past few years shows the difficulty of substantially increasing 
contribution rates. Labor unions and non-governmental organizations have proposed to 
increase government subsidies in order to recover the MI budget balance, which has 
deteriorated due to the recent rapid increase in MI expenditure. Considering all these facts, we 
assume that the government does not raise MI contribution rates.  
The generational accounts calculated based on these assumptions indicates that the fiscal 
burden of future generations is quite heavy. The account of MI for the future generations 
explains about 11.7% of Net Payment (I) or Net Payment (II), and about 14.5% of Net 
Payment (III) for the future generations. In contrast to the heavy burden of future generations, 
all age groups currently alive benefit from the MI. For example, the net benefit from MI for 
age 0 individuals is about 65.6% of the value for the NPS. The net benefits from the MI are 
quite high for older age cohorts, since older people are more susceptible to chronic and long-
term diseases. Comparing net benefits across the sexes, females benefit much more from the 
MI than males.  
                                                
43 The numbers of newly-hired male and female private school employees in 2002 were 5,448 and 11,965, 
respectively. 
44 The government also pays for the administrative cost of Medical Insurance, which is counted as government 
consumption expenditure. 
45 The level of government expenditure for health is relatively low compared with that of other OECD 
countries. The ratio of the expenditure to GDP for Korea is 2.98% as opposed to 5.94% for the OECD average. 
46 The scope of medical treatment covered by MI has been widened to chronic diseases and long-term treatment. 
47 Fees for medical treatment are quite low. This is the outcome of the governments small contribution plus 
small expenditure policy. 
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The accounts for Employment Insurance (EI) and Industrial Accident Compensation 
Insurance (IACI) indicate a relatively sound financial situation. The accounts of the EI and the 
IACI for future generations are relatively small compared with those of public pensions or 
Medical Insurance. This reflects the fact that the unemployment rate in Korea is relatively low 
and the coverage of accidental events by the IACI is considered quite narrow. However, we 
cannot preclude the possibility that expenditures of the EI and IACI will increase rapidly, 
since unemployment is expected to rise in the future and the coverage of accidental events by 
IACI is being extended. It is notable that the accounts of age groups classified as 
economically inactive are not balanced, since the EI and the IACI also provide survivors 
benefits and some annuity-type benefits. Comparing the accounts across sexes, the accounts 
of the IACI for females are smaller than for males, and the accounts are negative for all 
female age groups. This is mainly due to survivors benefits that go more to females. 
The fiscal burden caused by the social welfare programs such as the Minimum Living 
Standards Security (MLSS) system and other social welfare services and public assistance 
(OSTP) will not be very heavy, since in the projection of their aggregates we make a very 
conservative assumption about the income elasticity of social welfare expenditure (1.2), 
which is applied until the ratio of the sum of expenditure on the MLSS, the OSTP, and 
government expenditure on social welfare to GDP reaches the OECD average (4.12% of 
GDP). The present value of benefits from these programs for age 0 is about 80.7% of the 
value for the labor income tax. However, we cannot preclude the possibility that the 
expenditure of the MLSS will increase more rapidly than we projected, considering the 
reduction of work incentives caused by the MLSS. 
Another important feature of these programs is that, considering the age structure of the 
MLSS and OSTP benefits, they redistribute resource form the young to the old. Thus, 
population aging can impose an extra burden on future generations (see Figure 10). The 
benefits of these programs are shown to provide more to females than to males, since females 
are a large proportion of those in poverty. 
Tables 4-6 also report the present value, rest-of-life tax burdens by category. The largest 
present value (for ages 0 and age 30) is the consumption tax, followed by the capital income 
tax48, the tax on asset transactions, labor income tax, other taxes, and taxes on asset holdings. 
Three important characteristics of the Korean tax system are: (i) the large share of 
consumption taxes; (ii) the relative unimportance of labor income taxes; and (iii) the large 
proportion accounted for by taxes on asset transactions. Among consumption taxes, Value 
Added Tax (VAT) raises the largest revenue of all the taxes, and Special Excise Tax and 
                                                
48 Capital income tax (1) and (2) represent the capital income tax burden with and without the infra-marginal 
income tax adjustment, respectively. 
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Transportation Tax also contribute substantially to tax revenue. The average effective labor 
income tax rate is quite low, primarily due to the large proportion of tax-exempt workers, 
about 46% in 2000. However, labor-tax progressivity is quite high, since most labor income 
tax revenue is raised from relatively high-income workers. The large share of taxes on asset 
transactions is due to the high frequency of asset transactions rather than high tax rates. The 
circulation rate of equities in Korea is the highest in the world49, and the frequency of real 
estate transactions is also very high50. Compared to revenues from taxes on asset transactions, 
revenues from taxes on asset holding are very small. Taxing asset transactions, rather than 
asset holding, relatively heavily is but one illustration of the efficiency and fairness problems 
of Koreas tax system.  
The present value tax burden on older age groups, relative to that on younger age groups, is 
heaviest in the case of consumption taxes, followed by capital income taxes (1) (or capital 
income taxes (2)), taxes on asset holding, taxes on asset transactions, and labor income taxes. 
The age profile of accounts of the capital income tax is similar to that of the tax on asset 
holding, since the age profile of corporation tax burden, which comprises a large proportion 
of the capital income tax burden, is assumed to be the same as that of net wealth. It is 
remarkable that the accounts for the tax on asset transactions are relatively high for the 
younger age groups. This reflects the fact that securities (and owner-occupied housing) 
transactions are performed by relatively young age groups (see Figure 17). 
4.3. Establishing Generational Balance 
Tables 7 and 8 show that the magnitude of the adjustment of tax and social insurance 
contributions (tax, hence forth) and transfer payments required to attain long-run government 
budget balance is substantial51. Under the base case assumptions (g=1.5%, r=6.5%, medium 
fertility), the required tax adjustment is a 56-59% increase in tax burden under if the 
adjustment is made only for generations born in 2001 and thereafter. If the adjustment is made 
to all cohorts alive in 2004 and later, the required tax adjustment represents a 19-20% increase 
in tax burden. Delay in the tax adjustment raises its magnitude. For example, if we delay the 
tax adjustment until 2030, the required tax adjustment reaches 37-39%. If the proportional 
increase in the tax burden is accompanied with the same percentage decrease in transfer 
                                                
49 The rate is about 400% per year as of 2000. 
50 The frequency of real estate transactions is due primarily to expectations of appreciation. The rate of return on 
real estate was much higher than that from financial assets for the past several decades. Therefore, speculation 
in real estates markets was considered an effective way of accumulating wealth. 
51 Long-run budget balance is defined as the situation where the summation of current government net wealth 
and the present value of present and future flows of taxes and social insurance contributions is equal to that of 
transfer payments and government consumption. 
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payments to attain long-run government budget balance, the magnitude of the required 
adjustment decreases to 34-39% (if the adjustment is made only for the generations born in 
2001 and later years), 12-13% (if the adjustment is made to all the cohorts alive in 2004 and 
later) and 21-22% (if we delay the tax adjustment until 2030). 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Tables 9-13 report the results of sensitivity analyses under alternative assumptions about 
the fertility rate, the growth rate of labor productivity (g), the discount rate (r), and the income 
elasticity of the per capita level of MI benefits and social welfare expenditures (the MLSS and 
the OSTP). The alternative assumptions do not change the qualitative results explained above, 
even though the absolute levels of generational accounts are substantially affected by the 
changes in assumptions.  
It is remarkable that increase in the labor productivity increases the ratio of accounts for 
future generations to those for current generations (e.g. those for the age-0 cohort), which 
implies that the higher the growth rate is, the more fiscal burden is shifted to the future 
generations. This is due to the fact that the budgetary imbalance of public pensions and the MI 
is worsened as the growth rate increases. Our calculation shows that the present value of 
public pension benefits is more than double that of future contribution revenues52. Therefore, 
the gap between benefits and contributions will increase faster than contributions with 
productivity growth, since the benefits and contributions are proportionally related to the 
income level of participants. The budgetary imbalance of the MI is primarily due to the 
population aging. The population aging increases the ratio of benefits to contributions, if the 
ratio of the per capita contributions to benefits of the relevant age groups remains constant, 
since the ratio of the number of benefit recipients to that of contributors increases with 
population aging. Therefore, the gap between the benefits and contributions will increase with 
productivity growth, since the benefits and contributions are assumed exponentially related to 
the income level. Figures 25 and 26 show that the budgetary gap of public pensions and the 
MI become larger than contribution revenue starting around 2040, with the gap becoming 
larger afterwards.  
The ratio of accounts for future generations to those for current generations is quite 
sensitive to assumptions about the income elasticity of MI benefits and social welfare 
expenditures, which implies that future social welfare policies might substantially affect the 
long-run fiscal position of the Korean government. Under the high elasticity assumption 
                                                
52 The required adjustment to attain long-run budget balance of public pensions is estimated at about a 120% 
increase in contributions if the adjustment is made beginning in 2004. If the adjustment is delayed until 2010 
(2020), the required adjustment will increase to 135% (175%). 
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where the elasticities of MI benefits and social welfare expenditure are 1.73 and 1.53, 
respectively, the ratio (for Net Payment (I)) of accounts for future generations to that for age-0 
cohorts is about 265%, while under the low elasticity assumptions, where the elasticity for 
both benefits is 1, the ratio is about 185%. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper have reevaluated the long-term fiscal position using the Generational 
Accounting, which is modified to reflect the special features of fiscal situation in Korea, such 
as prospective change in the public pension benefit profiles and expected increase in social 
welfare expenditure. The findings of this paper suggest that unless policy toward existing 
generations in Korea is substantially altered, future generations will face excessively heavy 
fiscal burden over the course of their lives. The magnitude of the adjustment of tax and social 
insurance contributions burden required to attain the long-run government budget balance is 
substantial and delays of the adjustment exponentially increases the magnitude of adjustment 
required. It is also shown that a substantial part of fiscal burden on the future generations is 
explained by the long-run budgetary imbalance of public pensions and Medical Insurance.  
To establish the generational balance, the structural reform of the public pensions is needed. 
The imbalance between the benefit level and contributions should be removed. However, the 
combination of the benefit decrease and the increase in contribution may provide another 
distortion to the financial market and the economy, since the NPS fund is single fund operated 
by the government. Projection of the NPC indicates that the NPS fund will reach 40% of GDP 
early 2030s, if the current NPS policy is maintained. A simple adjustment of benefit level and 
contribution rate will deteriorate the situation of the financial market. Another issue related to 
the public pension is the imbalance of net transfer between the NPS and the occupational 
pensions. Therefore, we need more structural approach to the public pension reform, which 
minimizes the distortion of the financial market and removes the inequity between the NPS 
and the occupational pension participants.  
The imbalance between benefits and contribution of the Medical Insurance should be 
removed, through the increase in the contribution rates and revision of the compensation 
method for medical services under the Medical Insurance coverage, which provides the 
incentives to save the medical expense to the insurants and medical service providers. The 
revision of the MLSS is also needed. Even though the current expenditure by the MLSS is not 
very large, reduction of work incentives caused by the MLSS may cause rapid increase in the 
expenditure.  
In addition to the structural reforms of the social welfare policies, efforts to decrease the 
government consumption are necessary, since there will be many factors, which will require 
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the additional government increase, such as premature reunification and the default of the 
government guaranteed bonds, which amount to 106.8 trillion won (19.6% of GDP), as of 
2001.  
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Table 1. Consolidated Budget and Net Wealth of Korean Government 
(Unit: 1 trillion won (current prices), %) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Growth Rate  (1995-2000) 
Consolidated Budget (CB)1) 
Expenditure 71.6 (19.0)2) 
84.4 
(20.2) 
100.3 
(22.1) 
115.4 
(26.0) 
121.0 
(25.1) 
129.3 
(24.8) 
136.8 
(25.1) 12.7 
Revenue 72.8 85.5 93.4 96.7 107.9 135.8 144.0 13.5 
Balance 1.2 (0.3)2) 
1.1 
(0.3) 
-7.0 
(-1.5) 
-18.8 
(-4.2) 
-13.1 
(-2.7) 
6.5 
(1.3) 
7.3 
(1.3) - 
NPS Balance 3.5 4.5 4.7 6.0 7.0 11.2 13.4 - 
CB excluding NPS -2.2 (-0.6)2) 
13.4 
(-0.8) 
-11.7 
(-2.6) 
-24.7 
(-5.6) 
-20.0 
(-4.1) 
-4.7 
(-0.9) 
-6.1 
(-1.1) - 
Composition of Central Government Expenditure 
Total 71.0 83.8 99.1 112.4 118.2 126.8 132.23) 12.4 
General Public Service 3.0 3.4 4.2 5.0 4.4 6.7 - 19.1 
Defense 11.1 12.6 13.2 13.6 13.2 14.4 - 5.4 
Public Order and Safety 3.9 4.5 4.8 5.4 5.9 5.8 - 8.2 
Education 12.8 14.4 16.2 16.7 17.7 19.4 - 8.8 
Health Care 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.9 - 13.9 
Social Security and 
Welfare 6.4 7.9 9.6 12.3 14.7 19.3 - 25.0 
Housing and 
Community Amenities 5.7 7.1 6.7 7.0 9.6 6.8 - 6.2 
Recreational, Cultural, 
Religious Activities 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 - 20.0 
Fuel and Energy 0.5 1.2 1.4 2.5 1.9 0.8 - 27.4 
Economic 
Development 11.1 14.3 12.6 16.1 19.0 18.5 - 12.1 
Transportation and 
Communication 6.1 6.5 10.3 11.7 11.7 12.6 - 17.4 
Other expenditure 9.5 10.9 18.6 20.4 18.3 20.5 - 19.3 
Government Wealth and Debt 
Wealth 124.4 131.2 139.7 150.4 163.1 175.9 188.3 - 
Debt 35.6 (9.4)2) 
36.8 
(8.8) 
50.5 
(11.1) 
71.4 
(16.1) 
89.7 
(18.6) 
100.9 
(19.3) 
113.1 
(20.8) - 
Net Wealth 88.7 (23.5)2) 
94.4 
(22.6) 
89.2 
(19.7) 
79.0 
(17.8) 
73.4 
(15.2) 
75.0 
(14.4) 
75.2 
(13.8) - 
Note: 1) Includes the central government budget (general account, special account, public trust funds) and non-financial            
public enterprises. 
          2) Ratio to GDP (%) 
          3) The composition of government expenditure by function is not reported, since the composition is not comparable 
between 2000 and 2001. The government expenditure for each functional category in 2001 GFS of Korea is defined as 
the sum of government purchase and lending, while that reported in GFS of 2000 and earlier includes net lending 
rather than lending. The total government expenditure reported here is based on the 2000 definition. 
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Table 2. Assumptions on Fertility (unit: persons / 1,000 women) 
Year Low Fertility Medium Fertility (base case) High Fertility 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2040- 
1.47 
1.35 
1.32 
1.31 
1.27 
1.21 
1.15 
1.10 
1.47 
1.38 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.38 
1.39 
1.40 
1.47 
1.43 
1.45 
1.50 
1.54 
1.61 
1.69 
1.80 
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Fig.1 Public Pension Benefits (2000)
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Fig.2 Pension Contribution (2000)
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Fig. 3 Public Pension Benefit (2080)
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Fig.4 Public Pension Benefit Profile
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Fig.5 Public Pension Contribution Profile
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Fig.6  MI Benefit (2000)
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Fig.7 EI Benefit (2000)
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Fig.8 IACI Benefit (2000)
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Fig.9 MI, EI,  IACI Contribution (2000)
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Fig.10 MLSS Benefit (2000)
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Fig.11 OSTP Benefit (2000)
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Fig.12 Labor Income Tax (2000)
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Fig.13 Capital Income Tax (1) (2000)
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Fig. 14 Capital Income Tax (2) (2000)
(1,000 won)
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
age
male female
Fig.15 Consumption Tax (2000)
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Fig.16 Tax on Asset- Holding (2000)
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Fig.17 Tax on Asset Transactions (2000)
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Fig.18 Other Taxes (2000)
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Fig.19 Seigniorage (2000)
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Fig.20 Educational Benefits (2000)
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Fig.21 Net Tax I (2000)
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Fig.22 Net Tax II (2000)
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Fig.23 Net Tax III (2000)
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Fig.24 Net Tax I Profile of selected years
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Fig.25 Aggregate Public Pension Benefits
and Contributions
(% of GDP)
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Fig.26 Aggregate MI Benefits and
Contributions (% of GDP)
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Fig.27 Aggregatge MLSS, OSTP
Expenditure(% of GDP)
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Fig.28 Aggregate Tax Revenue (% of
GDP)
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Fig.29 Aggregate Tax Revenue
(% of GDP)
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